In the South Pacific winter of 2013, Michael Brassington
The Pasifika Festival held annually in Auckland is a case in point. What is ironic is that Pasifika promotes this pan-Pacific ideology of the
.
In 1966 my parents migrated individually from the Kingdom of Tonga. Not knowing one another in the islands, they met in Dunedin. They were from different social groups; my mother being half-European with a father of British citizenship, and my father being from a modest Catholic rural family. My mother travelled to Dunedin to do a diploma in shorthand typing at Otago Polytechnic. My father was sent there by the Government of Tonga on a trade training apprenticeship with the New Zealand Railways. She was an office clerk and he was a tradesman. Together, they were a migrant marriage of averageness and ordinariness.
Hardly revolutionists, my parents crossed the boundary that made them separate classes in Tonga to pair up in New Zealand as a particular type. Conformists working their migrant lives as state bureaucrats, and immigrants from a poor Pacific Island country, my mother and father adopted white New Zealand ambition becoming members of the materialistic middle-class in pursuit of financial mobility. By assimilating into Western state and society, they shook off Third World shackles of poverty coupled with aid and remittance dependency. For this I am conflicted in feeling gratitude and guilt.
I say gratitude because my parents did not keep up Tongan custom.
Growing up, I had similar social and intellectual freedoms afforded to my white school friends. My mother and father did not attend church, nor did they make me. Neither spoke Tongan to me, or expected that I learn. My parents never forced me to dress in Tongan costume, nor were social gatherings where culture and church were on display such as funerals, weddings, and birthdays, compulsory attendance. At high school I played sport, was in the senior debating team, won English speech competitions, and socialised in the weekends.
I considered myself to be a well-rounded Kiwi kid preparing through my school years to leave home at age eighteen for university and independence. Once I graduated, I would move into a specialist job, a middle-income salary, and a life where I made decisions as an individual, had financial purchasing power as a consumer, and took control as an adult. At primary school I knew I would go to university because my parents said I would, often telling me to study law. To them it was a respectable profession. By the time their only child completed high school, I was a confident public speaker with a high-level of English literacy, and they assumed lawyers made a considerable amount financially.
In actual fact I had life choices because my mother and father had a comfortable standard of living. It helped, giving me a material advantage, confidence, and security to enter university and adult life. I knew I could fall back on them if I ran into hard financial times. But what might have happened if my parents were not in a stable position to provide monetary help to their only child? Realistically, would I have achieved my education and career goals if they were low-income and poorly educated Tongan migrants expecting I contribute money to supplement their household expenditure?
AUT and USP Fiji workshop held in Auckland, New Zealand, from 29 April to 3 May 2013 for seven Samoan, Tongan, and Fijian student researchers enrolled in Masters and PhD theses. Publishing student essays on field research in a special edition of Te Kaharoa: The ejournal on Indigenous Pacific Issues was the gathering's purpose.
The hard-to-swallow truth is that I was no more gifted than many Pacific Islander young people my age born to parents who could not afford to pay for their children's education and career dreams. This is where guilt squatted on my conscience.
Guilt omitted a foul stench leaving a distasteful reminder Michel Foucault had convincingly argued that in any given society power produces knowledge; and power could be systematically narrowed down to wealth and skin colour (Foucault, 1980; Siolkas, 2012) .
Foucault was astute to observe that those who have power define knowledge over and about those who do not. Edward Said was justified to testify as a Palestinian Arab that the dominant power in the world, the West, meaning America and Western Europe, control what is believed to be real knowledge, or the truth about non-Western countries and cultures (Said, 1978 (Said, , 2003 . And Hawaiian educator Manulani Aluli Meyer was resolute to state that "truth telling is a higher frequency than the accumulation of facts" (Meyer, 2010) .
If truth telling, as Meyer averred, takes more "than the accumulation of facts," but rather, is subject to interpretation, the sense making of complex circumstances, then it is scientist Stephen Jay Gould's inquiry which is relevant here. He described Foucault's power and knowledge predicament using the example of the popular tribute that Albert Einstein was a genius. Gould recounted the scientific capacities of "Einstein's brain" did not provide a measurement of human intelligence (Gould, 1980) . The historical fact is many "people of equal talent" have never had the opportunity to pursue scientific careers like Einstein because structural discrimination worked against their class and race origins (Gould, 1980) . The question then is how does power prevent some from, while support others to, being producers, authorities, and gatekeepers of knowledge?
I am, somehow, less interested in the weight and convolutions of Einstein's brain than in the near certainty that people of equal talent have lived and died in cotton fields and sweat shops. (Gould, 1980) .
Unsettling the settler nation
Entrenched in the present-day politics of New Zealand universities which are funded and monitored by the state is a standard policy on achieving equity in the tertiary system. Equity by New Zealand's estimation lays emphasis on retaining Maori and Pacific students through to qualification completion.
Presented as a burdensome task which constructs Maori and Pacific students as a social problem, the difficulty is how to get a vulnerable group identified foremost by race, and secondarily by class, through the Western English-speaking qualifications system. Funnily enough the equity answer is not entirely aligned with liberal education, but can be traced to free market economics. Exemplifying this point was New Zealand's education and Pacific Island affairs minister, Hekia Parata, a Maori woman, who underlined the equity and economy link.
In this context, Parata exclaimed that "too many were Maori and Pacific Island students and too many were boys, brown boys" (Fea, 2013) . She was referring to the archetypical New Zealand student that fell under the national standard for graduating high school with adequate credits to enter university. The minister's solution was "to raise the academic achievement of its Maori and Pacific Island students to match those of Pakeha [white] students" because "New Zealand needed only so many doctors and lawyers. No economy could operate without tradespeople such as plumbers and auto electricians." Clearly she thought "too many brown boys" in her country could be moulded and moved into the workforce as New Zealand's tradespeople (Fea, 2013) .
Deep-seated discrimination lay in the insinuation that "brown boys" were not of sufficient human intelligence to be "doctors and lawyers." Hekia Parata, New Zealand Minister for Education and Pacific Island Affairs highlighted the equity dilemma of managing young Pacific peoples. Historically New Zealand was a white settler nation, a former colony of the 19th century British Empire which in the latter half of the 20 century reinvented itself as a modern multicultural nation to accommodate labour market changes.
A notable social transformation was seen in the post-1960s influx of Pacific Island migrants, many who settled in New Zealand and raised two generations of New Zealand born descendants (StricksonPua, 2013) . In the twenty first century, however, New Zealand struggled to adjust its settler nation psyche to cope with the country's fast-changing demographic. The reality that Asian and Pacific peoples, added alongside the indigenous Maori population, were growing at a rate that indicated in the near future they would be the largest ethnicities and cultures of New Zealand stirred social anxiety.
What would happen to the dominant Pakeha culture? Importantly, what would happen to the dominant position of Pakeha in the New Zealand economy? The fact that Pakeha New Zealanders were an aging population in contrast to an increasing youth bulge of Maori and Pacific peoples was viewed as an economic pitfall. Pessimism took hold of the social climate in that some did not believe Maori and Pacific peoples possessed the education and employment capability to sustain New Zealand's developed economy and standard of living.
On New Zealand's high rate of Maori and Pacific unemployment, Hone Harawira, Maori parliamentarian and leader of the Mana Party challenged Steven Joyce, the Minister for Tertiary Education, Skills and Employment. In the House, Harawira repeatedly pressed Joyce to admit that the National coalition government had worsened the economy by demonstrating a "total lack of commitment to reducing Maori and Pacific unemployment rates" (Harawira, 2013 (Harawira, 2013) .
Perhaps unintentionally, Harawira's pressing on "Maori and Pacific unemployment rates" pierced a festering sore on the New Zealand political landscape. Melani Anae had argued Pacific peoples were the "most unwanted sector of the New Zealand population at the bottom of the heap in all demographic, socio-economic indicators" (Anae, 1997, p. 131 Lumping Pacific Islanders together with Maori highlighted a marginalised and increasing critical mass where it was assumed that half were out of work, were not financial contributors to the economy, and were supported by state assistance deducted from working people's taxes. New Zealand's gloomy economic forecast compounded by a constricted job market made Maori and Pacific peoples an easy target for racism and the prejudiced belief that Polynesians are poor, uneducated, devious parasites living off state hand-outs and misusing the system (Shuttleworth, 2013) .
In the New Zealand winter of May 29th Al Nisbet, a Scottish cartoonist and migrant to Christchurch, got published in the Marlborough Express. He drew a racist impression of Maori and Pacific adults taking advantage of breakfast being provided for students in some, not all, New Zealand schools (Radio New Zealand, 2013b ). Nisbet's brownskinned, obese, thick lipped, and bulgy eyed figures looked deceitful and repulsive (Edwards, 2013) .
Characterised was a grotesquely fat Polynesian male commenting to a fat female: "If we can get away with this, the more cash left for booze, smokes and pokies" (Nisbet, 2013) . The message projected that adults of Polynesian race would abuse the state funded programme. It was believed the money saved from getting free food would be used by Maori and Pacific adults for alcohol, cigarettes, and gambling. In addition to this, a second cartoon similar in its derogatory depiction of Polynesians was published on June 1st in The Press which along with the Marlborough Express was a Christchurch based newspaper.
Nisbet's first cartoon appeared in the Marlborough Express two days after the New Zealand coalition government announced it was "putting $9.5 million over the next 5 years towards the KickStart Breakfast programme in schools" (Bennett, 2013; Radio New Zealand, 2013b) . Paula Bennett, the Minister for Social Development and Employment, stated in parliament that "this is in partnership with Fonterra and Sanitarium, and will be matched in value by them" (Bennett, 2013; Fonterra Communications, 2013) . But she slid back on explaining why the school breakfast programme was a social development priority in New Zealand. Instead, the minister held the judgement that "ultimately it is parents who are responsible for their children, but we cannot ignore the fact that some children turn up hungry and cannot learn on an empty stomach" (Bennett, 2013) . Paula Bennett's omission of reason, the unsaid triggers for child poverty, the silencing of structural inequalities which manufacture greater unemployment and lower education achievement for Maori and Pacific populations was harmful to New Zealand race relations. The fact there was an absence of ministerial leadership to opposing racism and discrimination against poor families unmasked a government that appeared not to know how to address poverty's root causes inside its own borders.
A tell-tale sign of antisocial behaviour, Al Nisbet denied his cartoon racially discriminated against Maori and Pacific peoples by stigmatising children in poverty and accusing brown-skinned adults of being dishonest, drunken, fat, irresponsible, and lazy. Failing to take ownership for the consequences of his derisive words and actions when feeding the white imagination, he shrugged off racism (Mills, 2000) . According to Nisbet, "drawing stereotypes is all part of cartooning. How else can various ethnicities be depicted? I'm often asked why I draw so ugly. It's because that's what I see. The human race is ugly and it does ugly things" (Nisbet, 2013) .
Contrary to the reason for having a Race Relations Commissioner, the New Zealand government's new appointment, Susan Devoy, failed to mediate expertly on public complaints made against Nisbet's cartoon caricatures and racist overtures. On May the 30th, Devoy gave a press statement closing down discussion on how cartoon caricature racism was irresponsible and detrimental to defenceless and at risk groups. She was certain "that the cartoons did not breach the level considered to be racist under the Human Rights Act" (Gillies and Quilliam, 2013; Microsoft Network New Zealand, 2013) . Her judgement was black-and-white. She did not advocate for the complainants who felt victimised by the published material.
Devoy paraded her ineptitude for performing an integral function that the role set out to accomplish. Basically, she was incompetent at identifying and naming racism. Former Race Relations Commissioner, Joris de Bres, was swift to signal this: "It may not be illegal, but it is certainly racist" (de Bres, 2013a).
de Bres' observation cut to the bone of contention. While Devoy was resolute that "you have to look at what, under Section 61, will incite racial disharmony and that won't do this" (Radio New Zealand, 2013e) , it did not appease the reality that a denigrating representation of the Polynesian race were the cartoons and the cartoonist's signature. On this point, de Bres was astute. de Bres discussed social responsibility pointing at the editor's role in the media industry. Questioning the "freedom of expression" argument in the context of racial inscriptions about Maori and Pacific Islanders produced by white commentators, his stand was unwavering that "racist cartoons" should not be endorsed by editors and publishers (de Bres, 2013b) . "Just because you have the right to say something, doesn't mean you have the right to have it published," de Bres announced (de Bres, 2013b) . Here was the counter argument to "freedom of expression" in that racist publications "feed bigotry" to the public. Uncontrolled prejudice and intolerance therefore results in discrimination against "whole classes of people" (de Bres, 2013b; Dally, 2013) . And the people targeted are made inferior in a society, a political economy, a media industry dominated by white people, white culture, and white values, tastes, and canons (Said, 1978; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Bradbury, 2013 Verses from Sacha Norrie's poem stress the invisibility of Pakeha or white privilege in New Zealand society. Norrie is not suggesting that the effects of privileging one race, class, and culture is imperceptible to peoples who are not white. To the contrary; what the poet means is that as an insider of Pakeha culture it is a given, a taken for granted belief that the superior positioning of white people in the politics, society, and economy of New Zealand is normal.
Al Nisbet in the Dominion
The New Zealand High Commission in Tonga's capital, Nuku'alofa, is a New Zealand assembled high-security building which resembles better quality and condition than the Government of Tonga offices.
Privilege goes unchallenged as Norrie notes by saying "being Pakeha means that I never have to be made aware of being so damn Pakeha" (Norrie, 2013) . This is the danger of willful ignorance; that is, the predicament in which one is not expected to, nor has pressure put on them to be mindful of, the circumstances which construct and favour their privileged position in a social and economic hierarchy (Bradbury, 2013) .
Not grasping why peoples who are not white are not afforded equal benefits incubates a singular view of the world and one's place in it. Singularity grows inequity by becoming a standard measurement of all others, where all others fall short of the standard. In the case of New Zealand, certain social conditions reared disparate power relations between a dominant Pakeha population and Maori and Pacific peoples representing the underprivileged.
It was the country's financial uncertainty, complicated by a global centering of neoliberal strategies that downsized the public sector and deregulated the economy to increase private sector business, which framed vulnerable groups as an obstruction to state progress (Tanielu and Johnson, 2013) . By this, I mean that Maori and Pacific peoples provided a convenient scapegoat to blame for why the New Zealand economy was frail and faltering.
"I am the coloniser said no Pakeha ever" was not confined to inside the New Zealand border (Norrie, 2013) . Instead it contained an attitude, a mindset, which Pakeha New Zealanders carried outside to the Pacific Islands through expatriates in regional business, and high commissions equipped with the NZAID programme. For the Kingdom of Tonga, diplomatic exchanges between the Tongan state and the New Zealand High Commission to Tonga set the stage of actors from which to interpret Pakeha or Palangi thought and behaviour. This very government to government relationship was a directory on power in the South Pacific, indicating which countries were jostling for supremacy in the region, and to an extent, gesturing that China as an aid donor presented a problem to the Western stronghold.
The Tongan state and citizens were by no means politically naïve and uninformed. In actuality, Tongans were media savvy and sensitive to the West-East power struggle in which the United States, Australia, and New Zealand had upped their collective might throughout the South Pacific for selfpreservation; that is, to prevent China from getting a financial and strategic upper hand over them in an ocean terrain that was historically an extension of Western influence. In terms of regional polity, the twenty first century was proving different and distinct from the twentieth.
A significant detail overlooked by researchers and political analysts was not the overdone story that the United States, Australia, and New Zealand were having difficulty managing China's presence in the South Pacific. But rather, it was the manner by which the Tongan state had adapted to West-East tension which provided valuable insight. Tonga had learnt to manoeuvre around the politics of rivalling world powers, and intuitively knew to massage aid donor egos in attempting to push local development agendas past the inescapable global order dictating what rich countries want with poor ones.
Propaganda purposes
The public filter feeding the masses key messages on Tonga's aid donor relations was the Tonga Broadcasting Commission (TBC), a state owned radio and television network with an Internet website and YouTube account outflanking in resources and reach, independent news providers. The Government of Tonga and aid donors from the USA, Australia, New Zealand, China, and Japan gave speeches of thanks, pledged partnership, shook hands, and posed with forced diplomatic smiles on the airwaves. Considering Tonga's 2013 and 2014 budget estimates drew from TOP $35.7 million for budget support and TOP $50.3 million for development projects in aid donations and bank grants, high commissioners and foreign ambassadors with copious contributions made the public broadcaster's important news (Government of Radio New Zealand, 2013h) .
Perceptibly, the state development project receiving media coverage both locally and regionally in Australia and New Zealand was the laying of Tonga's underwater fibre optic cable, 826 kilometres in distance from Fiji (Tonga NZ Net, 2012; Australia Network News, 2013 and Communications, 2013; Tonga NZ Net, 2013) . None were more joyous than the government bureaucracy, Tonga's largest employer and consumer of the Intenet. Paula Ma'u, chief executive officer at the Ministry of Information and Communication saw that Tonga getting broadband meant the Internet was "not only faster and bigger capacity but it will also be cheaper for the people, for the businesses, and for Tonga" (Palu, 2013 (Palu, 2013) .
"The Tongan community" profited from broadband Internet because it would "improve lives," publicised Lord Tu'ivakano. How "communications technology" guaranteed a better standard of living for people below the poverty line in developing countries, the speechmaking of Tonga's Prime Minister did not explain. How poor Tongan people could afford a "more accessible internet," the Premier withheld from comment. Besides, it was unlikely the poor had called a public meeting to tune into the Prime Minister's announcement broadcasted on Radio and Television Tonga News. His audience was the state bureaucracy, businesses, schools, tertiary institutes, and working adults with regular income capable of paying one of Tonga's two Internet companies for a "cheaper price" connection in their homes (World Bank, 2013) .
Cheaper price and more accessible internet will maximize the power and versatility of communications technology, to accelerate development and improve the lives of the Tongan community. (World Bank, 2013).
World Bank information and communication technologies (ICT) policy specialist, Natasha Beschorner, shared the Prime Minister of Tonga's optimism that a faster connection ushered in advantages "for the Tongan people." The people would gain "new job opportunities" (World Bank, 2013) . Elaborating on the trickle-down theory in which newfound jobs got to people on the financial fringe did not appear in Beschorner's wisdom. The World Bank press release celebrated its US$17.2 million donation alongside the Asian Development Bank's US$9.7 million grant that plugged broadband Internet into a small island developing state.
It was not about filling in ICT consumption and production details.
High speed internet promises significant benefits for social and economic development, and new job opportunities for the Tongan people. (World Bank, 2013).
My argument is that for Tonga it is not media freedom by way that the state shuts down independent reporting, which subverts constitutional civil liberties guaranteed to all citizens -noblemen and commoners, rich and poor, men and women. Rather, it is the adoption of information communication technologies (ICT) as well as social media by the Tongan state that can place under surveillance, and silence, social criticism and activism. What has evolved is a democratised state grafted to an authoritarian structure and frame of mind. The machinery of government has found it useful to appropriate the Internet as an everyday tool to expand and embed its "propaganda purposes" (Morozov, 2011, p. xiv) .
It comes as no surprise the Tongan state governs over Internet use, and proposes a law to police and regulate it. Additionally, the state is the wealthiest and largest organisation using the Internet to publish, communicate, and disseminate information.
Here, I have borrowed Evgeny Morozov's theory on The Net Delusion: The Dark Side Internet Freedom (2011) to counter argue that broadband Internet is not a conclusive social equity tool affording development to an entire population in a small island developing state. Digital communication exhibits the proficiency to worsen wealth divisions between class, gender, and age groups, excluding the impoverished, the most vulnerable from Internet access and acquisition.
As Morozov recounted; "the role of the Internet penetrates and reshapes all walks of political life, not just the ones conducive to democratization" (Morozov, 2011, p. xiv (Morozov, 2011, p. 
xiv).
Keep Vava'u Green is a non-profit environmental organisation of community volunteers, based in Utah, USA, and led by 'Eseta Schaaf.
The organisation sponsors the rubbish and recycling bins pictured here at Lupepau'u Airport in Vava'u, Kingdom of Tonga.
In name, the Government of Tonga wielded the Internet for engineering greater transparency to the Tongan public. But a crucial inquiry on social equity and participatory democracy remained to be asked; that is, how would community activists voice dissent to state development programmes by use of Internet media?
A situation emerged where government messages reposted everyday were symbolic of Tonga's ICT landscape. Moreover, advertising the government's Internet campaign through social media pages such as Radio and Television Tonga on Facebook had indoctrinated Internet users to uncritically read the script as development and progress.
Therefore, how realistic was it to mobilise grassroots movements aimed at empowering and educating the bottom of the economic ladder through ICT? Given that household costs for fast Internet kept the lower tier out of the information loop, how could rural villages and outer islands seize ICT? Was it conceivable to contest the digital power, ownership, and authority of the state bureaucracy to advance community development outside of government surveillance and control?
The Government of Tonga Internet campaign was not about social equity. It was, for the most part, an execution of social control (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) . Presented was an extensive and all-encompassing system of digitally centring the state as the organising point on which the nation, the people, revolved (Australian Network News, 2013) . A simplistic American-driven formula for equity was at work in which it was thought that everybody would have a chance at obtaining fast Internet, opening up widespread opportunities for employment and education. Contrarily, a doubtful scenario took shape because as Christopher Emdin mentioned: "Equity is not about giving everybody the exact same thing" (Emdin, 2012) . To recap, equity is not about making everyone the same by a universal one-size-fits-all prescription. In this context, Emdin spoke on the practice of equity. (Emdin, 2012) . By Emdin's estimation, equity meant recognising difference and diversity. Ideally, although all people are equal in humanness, humanity, and being human, the fact is everyone is not the same; nor should citizens be forced by the state to think, behave, speak, and aspire to sameness. For Tonga, a small, insular, and hierarchical society transitioning towards state democratisation, convention and conformity were highly valued principles underpinning national cohesion.
Equity is not about giving everybody the exact same thing. Equity is about hearing somebody's voice about what they need, and providing them with that.
Equity had gotten tangled up with equality blurring the boundary between state and citizen.
Consequently, the government seemed undecided if its role was the regulator for national development across all sectors, or a facilitator for communities to pursue development priorities of their choosing and informed consent. Amidst confusion the state attempted both, concocting an insipid process by which progress was calculated by homogeneity and standardisation. Paulo Freire's classic text, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, discussed "dehumanization" as a "historical fact," a systematic process where human beings oppressed by the state are objectified as things, categories, groupings, classes, rather than being treated as people. To Freire, this "engenders violence" in the way that the structure and process controlling and containing oppressed peoples requires the establishment of an unjust order, which in turn, the oppressor believes is the status quo (Freire, 2006, p. 44 (Freire, 2006, p. 44) . Oppressed (2006) resonates in the historical treatment of Pacific Islanders in New Zealand (Minto, 2013) . In particular, the present neoliberal climate cultivates Pakeha racism against Maori and Pacific peoples, which is accepted by conventions of dominant white culture as normal (Mason, 2013; Mayeda and Sobieski, 2013) .
It is clear-cut to see how Freire's Pedagogy of the
My interest is how a system of "dehumanization" has been replicated by the Government of Tonga's national development agenda.
The countless empty references to "the Tongan people" and "the Tongan community" evoked by the Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, government officials, aid donors, and international banks have produced hollow echoes.
Historically, Tongan communities were not directly involved in decision making for national development projects reported by the Tonga Broadcasting Commission as beneficial to the people. Community partnerships were not part of the government's vocabulary. The state equals the authority, the controller, the appraiser. Expressly, the Government of Tonga has come to know how to mimic Western development partners from the USA, Australia, and New Zealand when performing public speeches on camera. Party to its own dehumanization process, the state eats, excretes, and believes its political propaganda.
The query I have is straightforward; how do community activists take social action firstly, to confront the Government of Tonga on change they want carried out, and secondly, to gather support from the affected communities they affiliate to? Related to this, how relevant is ICT for organising and achieving social action in criticism of the state?
I don't hobnob with the powerful

I don't hobnob with the powerful ever. The only interaction I have with powerful officials is chasing them somewhere. My hope is that people use the book as actionable intelligence. I want it to be actionable intelligence to work toward a democratic process of confronting our own fear and also holding those in power accountable. I think all of us should be defined not by the public pronouncements of politicians, but by what we do in response to the actions they're doing in our name. And that's the spirit I wrote this book in. Jeremy Scahill
The excerpt by American journalist Jeremy Scahill is from an interview with a television reporter Amy Goodman, as well as renowned academic Naom Chomsky (Goodman, 2013 The revelation of Dirty Wars ruptured the popular belief among Western ally countries, of which Tonga is a military ally serving in Afghanistan, that the United States of America represent the good guys (Scahill, 2013 ).
Scahill's field interviews with American special operations forces including central intelligence agents (CIA) and mercenaries uncovered alarming facts. A double war was going on through American drone strikes and night raids on defenceless villages and families, some who were United States citizens targeted by their own government.
Scahill forwarded an inquiry for public consideration: In a democratic system is it ever tolerable for a government to murder innocent people including its own citizens? His answer was evident in the reference to "actionable intelligence" as a means to "holding those in power accountable" (Goodman, 2013) . "Actionable intelligence" was social justice in practice; publicly exposing information sufficing legal and moral action to ensure "democratic process" was meaningful, answerable, and responsible to citizens.
For Tongan communities, the idea of "actionable intelligence" conveyed a chequered history (Goodman, 2013) . Before people could advocate social justice causes to their government, they were first required to navigate safely through a political minefield without getting blasted. The state was permanently on the defensive because a hazardous torrent of accusations and court actions between 'Akilisi Pohiva, the parliamentary leader of the Democratic Party of the Friendly Islands and successive governments had allowed heavyhanded politics to tarnish grassroots advocacy (Pacific Media Centre, 2013; Radio New Zealand, 2013i; Radio and Television Tonga News, 2013) . In reality, national-level politicking between the opposition and the government of the day, seldom, if ever, spoke for a community-based rationale from various constituencies. Alternatively, a principle for Tongan community activism through social action could be seen in Scahill's proclamation: "I don't hobnob with the powerful ever" (Goodman, 2013) . This was the least treacherous tactic compared to "actionable intelligence" for attaining social justice. Social awareness was expressed among community researchers, advocates, and writers (Goodman, 2013) . By this, it became comprehensible that the powerful in Tonga, whether they were traditional leaders, politicians, clergy, the highly educated, or business people, shared a common characteristic: They commanded power over the masses, the kind of islander muscle that was domineering, overbearing, and stifling to speak up to.
Tongan academic Siosiua Lafitani saw that "religion and morality should be both critically adjusted" so they are attuned in concept and practice (Lafitani, 2013) . Lafitani viewed Tongan society in a state of rapid moral decay, and that there were contradictory forces at work when a devoutly Christian nation possessing a high number of doctorates has an "increasing rate of violence in all aspects of life" (Lafitani, 2013 (Lafitani, 2013) .
Lafitani posed a conundrum: "Why does it happen?" Not singly motioning to the rise of violence and violent crime in Tonga, the quandary he alluded to was why the mismatch? If Christianity and education were highly valued by Tongans then why have religious principles and intellectual thought had little effect on resolving social degeneration? Lafitani's examination expounded that social action had to be modified and improved because past practices missed the mark.
Different to church dogma and academic convention, a new type of community activism gathered momentum. A younger generation of Tongans resident overseas were collaborating with grassroots organisations in the homeland. Research questions were harder. Answers avoided a bargain basement mentality of cutting-and-pasting models from other countries that did not fit the local people, nor suit the surroundings.
And the Tongan state was decoded as a maze of tangled relationships.
Subjected to USA and China tension, community activists knew that Tonga's development was done through trade-offs, shifting alliances, and unceasing adjustment to the temporality and instability of impermanent grants, funding, loans, and income sources.
The only constant factors the Tongan state seemed to know were change and uncertainty. (Schaaf, 2013) . Live shark finning was not outlawed in Tonga and it was uncertain whether the dorsal fins had been lacerated from live sharks.
My name is 'Eseta Schaaf
Twenty five days after sighting shark fins laced across scaffolding at the back of Neiafu Shopping Centre, Schaaf received a digital photograph from her colleague Aunofo Havea on June 8th. The picture showed the Chinese shop owner had removed the supply from public view. Where the Chinese delicacy had been moved to, Havea and Schaaf did not know. "They're a pretty closed off bunch" Schaaf remarked, stressing that different to New Zealand, Australian, and American expatriates whom Tongans were accustomed to interacting with in public, the Chinese were guarded, cloistered, and kept to themselves.
Between 1983 and 1991 the Government of Tonga sold illegal passports to largely Hong Kong and mainland Chinese nationals, manufacturing a political era which irreversibly altered the twenty first century landscape (Robie, 1991) . Travel writer David Stanley observed, "The number of Chinese operated hotels and restaurants in Nuku'alofa indicates where many of the buyers ended up" (Stanley, 2000, p. 374) . Chinese owners of shops, hotels, and restaurants overshadowed Tongan businesses in the present, and although there was disquiet among locals, open hostility for the larger part was kept under wrap (Australian Broadcasting Commission, 2013; Coutts, 2013a; Radio New Zealand, 2013a , 2013d . 'Eseta Schaaf's publicity about shark fins hanging outside a Chinese owned shop in Tonga probed at the rawness of two cultures in a head-on collision (Anderson, 2012; Hill, 2013b) . She exposed the reality of ordinary people's lives; an angle from which to see the world that Tongan media passed over, favouring top-heavy news about the monarchy, nobility, government, parliament; stories of men in leadership, rarely ever women. The strategy of confronting the Chinese shop owner on what Schaaf and her supporters saw as a transgression was not, by any means, a Chinese method for conflict resolution. No direct communication occurred but instead, the stash was removed from public sight indicating the shop owner knew of complaints, and perhaps, that Schaaf had made inquiries with police and the fisheries division about whether the state protected sharks.
Schaaf and Havea were not so naïve they expected the shark trade to stop in their Native islands because of their community activism through Internet and social media, Radio Australia, Radio New Zealand, Radio Tonga, as well as an online petition to the Minister for Fisheries (Schaaf, 2013; Coutts, 2013b; Latu, 2013; New Zealand Kaniva Pacific, 2013; Tonga Broadcasting Commission, 2013; Radio Australia, 2013; Radio New Zealand, 2013g; Tonga NZ Net, 2013) . Significant, however, was the usefulness of Tongan community Internet media for working across an ocean distance, Schaaf in Salt Lake City, USA, and Havea in Vava'u, Tonga, to get public support for an outer island cause. These Vava'u women led their own non-profit community organisations; Keep Vava'u Green was based in Utah and Kalauni O Tonga Voyaging Society in Vava'u. Community leaders of their generation, they felt a social responsibility to advocate for shark conservation by raising local and international awareness, and speaking up to the Tongan state (Ife, 2012) .
Representing a story about our people, our islands, our times, it was one that did not feature on front page Tongan newspapers, or receive prime time radio and television coverage. Adrian Stevanon, Pacific Islander reporter for Native Affairs, a Maori Television documentary programme, criticised New Zealand media for "failing to cover the Pacific region properly" (Hill, 2013a ). Stevanon's solution was to recruit Pacific Islander journalists to work in newsrooms (Small, 2013; Sergel, 2013) .
But what of Pacific countries like Tonga where the islanders in newsrooms are dwarfed by public funded commissions and buy-into state "propaganda purposes?" (Morozov, 2011, p. xiv) . Realistically, is independent, critical, investigative, and community oriented reporting plausible under political conditions of self-censorship? In the islands, reporters, researchers, and publishers exercise caution in what they think, write, and speak because they know state surveillance is watching.
The real shark
The real shark story was the United States. America put Pacific Island countries under no pressure to institute laws banning the shark trade inside their territories and regionally to the Hong Kong market. Without the weight of Western aid donors, especially America, to weaken China's grip as the leading importer of shark fins, Tonga as a small island developing state had little self-motivation to prohibit shark trading in its waters.
Despite environmental truths that live finning was a cruel practice, and sharks were ruthlessly depleted from overfishing in the Pacific Ocean, if the aid donor hierarchy did not itemise this for discussion at high-level international meetings then the Tongan political radar did not pick up the signal (Garrett, 2013; Goldin, 2013; Islands Business, 2013; Radio New Zealand, 2013c; Radio New Zealand, 2013f; Strahan, 2013;  The Permanent Mission of Fiji to the United Nations, 2013). Clearly, Tonga's national development was not defined by its people; end of story.
American ocean environmentalist, Angelo Villagomez, explained that the United States federal government had proposed regulations for the Shark Conservation Act that could overturn laws prohibiting shark trading in American states and territories, such as Hawai'i (Hill, 2013b (Hill, 2013b) .
In the final analysis, development was about trade; countries that could trade to capacity developed over countries that could not.
But this did not mean that developed countries ahead in world trade demonstrated greater intelligence and ethics in how they went about their business. This is what Siosuia Lafitani hinted at: How could we forfeit intelligence and ethics to become second-rate cartoon caricatures of Western society?
Pacific Rim cities were settlements Tongan people migrated to, often finding themselves marginalised and appreciating the small islands they descend from. Overseas life gave them an experiential understanding that there are certain qualities about Tonga that cannot, and should not, be up for sale (Komai, 2013) .
My analysis as a university lecturer is the hardest lesson to teach Tongan postgraduates born in New Zealand and wanting to research dissertations and theses is the function of social criticism in the origin homeland. In my idealism, I want to believe the role of the social critic is fundamental to national development, integral to asking rigorous questions of state and society, vital to testing and strengthening civil freedoms and democratic principles (Mills, 2000) . "But this is Tonga," as my father has frequently informed me; an instinctive reminder that it might not work there the way it does here, which it does not.
Therefore, what use is criticism to Tongan society? In the future, will the state appoint social critics to e-publish Internet stories monitored by the Ministry of Information and Communications and Tonga Broadcasting Commission? Understandably, New Zealand born Tongans elect to research Tongan development in New Zealand not Tonga; the cost of self-censorship and loss of intellectual and social freedom too taxing.
If I am the only one choosing to research the homeland over New Zealand, my place of birth, then it is because I will not accept critical thinking has no purpose in my ancestral islands.
